Macro

Nobody left to buy British? How to save the UK equity market

The FT has woken up to the shrinking of the UK equity market, but it has the diagnosis wrong. Buybacks are not the problem, the IPO drought is not global, and the damage was self-inflicted.

First published in Noise Cancelling

UK souvenir bargain bin
C.S. Lewis

Of all tyrannies, a tyranny sincerely exercised for the good of its victims may be the most oppressive.

C.S. LewisThe Humanitarian Theory of Punishment, 1949

In this research piece I return to a favourite hobby horse of mine, not just because it’s something I’ve written about before and am very interested in, but also because it’s something anyone or any institution interested in UK equity investment should be concerned about.

That includes anyone with an equity ISA, a pension, an investment or unit trust, or an equity portfolio with UK-listed companies in it. It should also include the government, regulators, the LSE, the Bank of England and any listed company or one thinking about listing (that’s not a long list, it would appear).

In fact, anyone interested in the long-term health of the UK economy should be concerned about this issue, which has attracted some welcome coverage in the FT in the last week, and not before time.

The issue I’m talking about here is the seemingly inexorable shrinking of the UK equity market, most graphically represented by the dramatic fall in the number of listed companies and the near total absence of IPOs.

But this manifestation of institutional failure and neglect, for that is what it is, doesn’t just lead to fewer listed companies. It also gradually strips away the critical capabilities of a properly functioning equity capital market, eventually leaving it unable to serve the needs of its host economy. For a market that can trace its roots back to the 17th century and was a key part of the development of the City of London over the last three hundred years, it is a particularly depressing failure.

This was also topic of this week's Show

Scaled capital for AI, but not via London

Although I can detect virtually no government or Treasury interest in this pressing issue, periodically it does attract some coverage in the media, and a couple of recent pieces in the FT prompted me to write about it again. The first piece I read was actually quite uplifting, albeit that it started by outlining why two high-profile US venture capital firms were leaving London (Sequoia and a16z).

But the article went on in a more positive tone by describing how well the founder of DeepMind (Demis Hassabis) and his alumni have done in raising scaled capital for their follow-on AI ventures, which include Isomorphic Labs, Ineffable Intelligence and Recursive Superintelligence. These three, together with Nscale, the data centre developer, and Wayve, the self-driving taxi company, have raised close to $7bn this year alone.

Although small in relation to the up to $64bn that Anthropic alone is raising in its imminent IPO, this is clearly very positive and shows that early-stage UK companies can attract scaled capital, albeit that they are all in one hot sector and that the majority of the investment was sourced from overseas investors.

So, although very exciting and positive, this is by no means a reflection of a vibrant UK VC industry and of course also has nothing to do with the UK stock market. Indeed, if any of these businesses do decide to list, I can well imagine that the problems currently assailing the UK market, unless addressed fundamentally and soon, will mean that they will all be drawn to NASDAQ and not the FTSE.

Market failure, muddled diagnosis

The next FT piece, entitled “Market Failure”, focused on some of the issues I have written about in previous NC articles but represents, in my opinion, muddled thinking with respect to the causes and symptoms of a failing UK stock market.

For example, one of the causes listed is a lack of tech stocks, which I am not convinced is a good reason at all. Others are, but the most significant are missed.

So, pension fund asset allocation is included as a cause, as are the burdens of listing and stamp duty, but excluded are the damaging pension reforms that caused pension funds to shift their asset allocation in the first place, the MiFID reforms which fundamentally undermined the institutional investor/stockbroker/listed company ecosystem, especially in the mid and small-cap parts of the market, and the inexorable rise of passive investment.

The article then goes on to cite a “seminal” paper published in 1989 by the Harvard Business Review that argued that the traditional listed company had outlived its usefulness because of the conflict between management and shareholders over the allocation of free cash flow.

Apparently this 37-year-old paper, which I’ve never heard of, argued that cash was too often spent on low-return projects, and the “solution” in theory appeared to be a corporate structure with no public shareholders and no listing, but where oversight was exercised through the discipline of the regular servicing and repayment of debt. Its author didn’t like share buybacks either.

The FT piece then goes on to lament the partial de-equitisation of the UK equity market via corporate share buybacks, which it puts at £56bn in 2026 (up to the end of October), and then hints darkly that they are used to artificially boost earnings, thereby enabling management to maximise compensation.

Who holds management to account?

Muddled thinking is way too kind a description of this garbled nonsense. Institutional shareholders who represent the interests of their investors exist to hold management to account on all sorts of things, but right at the top of that list is how capital is allocated. That’s what I did every time I sat in front of the management teams running the businesses I had invested in on behalf of my investors.

If there are no institutional shareholders, as is the case in the Harvard paper, or at least no one representing their interests, then the only sanction, as the article suggests, is lenders calling in debt. But in my experience, by the time a bank or an investor calls in a debt it’s typically catalysed by the results of years of capital misallocation, by which time it’s too late and massive damage has already been inflicted on the value of a business.

I have also never been a fan of excess leverage, either in private equity models or in theoretical ones. Indeed, leverage was one of the ways in which a smart person can go broke, according to Charlie Munger, Warren Buffett’s brilliant lifelong companion, and in my experience excessive leverage was and is always a red flag, even in the most stable businesses – Thames Water being an excellent recent example.

In defence of buybacks

The other mistake this article makes is bad-mouthing share buybacks, which for me are a key option in the capital allocation decision-making process. If the returns from investing in an existing business (buying back shares) exceed those available from investing in a new one or a new project, which typically come with more risk, then this should be a legitimate choice for a management team and board.

Shareholders should loudly applaud those that use buybacks as a well-thought-through capital allocation option, which at the very least should serve as a return test for all other allocation decisions. In other words, investing in growth should always be tested against this return benchmark.

In practice, the binary lens that academics too often view the world through – buybacks or investing in growth – is not the world I encountered. More typical is the world in which most good businesses generate more cash than they need to finance their growth, and buybacks are what happens after a business has already funded its expansionary capex.

The other point to make in relation to buybacks is that they are a reflection of how the managers of listed businesses view their companies’ valuations.

In a market like the UK, where company valuations are objectively depressed relative to peers, to history and to the returns being achieved by those businesses (ROE, ROCE), is it any wonder that buybacks exceed IPOs and secondary offerings by a factor of over 3 to 1? (Total capital raised in the UK equity market in 2025 via IPOs and secondaries was £18.5bn, whilst share buybacks by FTSE 100 companies alone totalled a record £58.6bn in the same year.)

£58.6bnShares bought back by FTSE 100 companies in 2025, a record (AJ Bell)
FTSE 100 BUYBACKS VS EQUITY RAISED IN LONDON · £BN2025

Buybacks dwarfed the new equity raised in London in 2025

3.2×
FTSE 100share buybacks£58.6bnEquity raisedin London£18.3bnof which IPOs£2.1bn£BN
AJ Bell (buybacks); LSEG, to 16 December (equity raised).

Is de-equitisation really global?

The final mistake in the brief article is its conclusion that, aside from India, the US and China, where equity markets are thriving, the UK is not alone in experiencing what it calls a multiyear “drought” or de-equitisation, which it suggests is part of a broader international trend. This is another bogus conclusion, which presumably originates from the idea that the boom in private equity must detract from public equity.

Although there is some truth sprinkled into this daft conclusion, the fact is that the US, India and China account for 70% of the MSCI global index and, when I did a quick search for the number and scale of IPOs on a list of other randomly selected major and non-mainstream markets, I did not see any evidence of de-equitisation.

For example, take Korea, where there were 77 new listings in 2025 that raised about 4.57tn won (roughly $3.2bn), or Japan, where there were 66 IPOs that raised about ¥1.3tn (roughly $8.5bn), or Saudi Arabia, which had about 38 offerings raising $4.2bn. Or take Nigeria, where a single IPO this year, Dangote Petroleum Refinery’s offer of about $1.6bn, which closed at the end of October, is worth about 60% of all the money raised by IPOs in London in the whole of 2025.

So apart from the US, India, China, Korea, Japan, Saudi, Nigeria and all the other emerging markets which are growing, there’s plenty of evidence of de-equitisation! (As an aside, this reminds me of the Monty Python “What have the Romans ever done for us?” sketch.)

The great British corporate sell-off

Which brings me naturally to the third article in the FT, which was entitled “The great British corporate sell-off”, a subject I have written about on numerous occasions in the last few years. This piece got top billing by receiving “The Big Read” title and was focused on what I see as the product of what the previous articles had touched on but not fully explained.

This is getting silly: why the bids for UK companies keep comingI wrote about the bids for UK companies in AugustThis is getting silly: why the bids for UK companies keep comingIn the middle of the August lull, bids for UK-listed companies keep coming and the premia keep getting bigger. The explanation is structural, two decades in the making, and almost nobody in government appears to have noticed.10 August 2026

In summary, the pension accounting and regulatory reforms which undermined the structure of the UK equity market over the last twenty or more years have left it structurally weakened, neglected and even ignored by many of the UK’s domestic investing institutions, by the government and by international investors, who argue coherently: if your domestic institutions don’t buy your market, then why should we? This neglect has had a profound impact on the overall market and can be seen vividly in the following charts.

First, decades of institutional selling from pension funds that were once the biggest investors in the market has depressed its valuation. Some of this difference with the US can of course be explained by the lack of a highly rated UK tech sector, but this is not the only reason for the valuation differential. Peer comparisons of the valuation of oil companies and banks, for example, clearly reflect something else going on.

TRAILING 12-MONTH PRICE/EARNINGS RATIOJAN 2007 – OCT 2026 · MONTHLY

The valuation gap between US and UK shares has widened since 2016

−43%
FTSE 100S&P 500
5101520253035UKUSAJan 07Jan 12Jan 17Jan 22Oct 26
Bloomberg.

A dysfunctional market that cannot and does not offer the right support environment for young companies that might otherwise have considered a listing means that the population of listed companies keeps falling – dramatically. The fact that in real terms the market cap of the market is now smaller than it was at the turn of the millennium is utterly shocking.

Two bar charts of UK-listed companies, annual, 1970 to 2025. Left: the number of companies, from about 3,400 in 1970 to about 1,500 in 2025. Right: market capitalisation in real terms, which rose to about £3.5tn around 2000 and is about £2.6tn in 2025.
The number of UK-listed companies has almost halved in the past 20 years. Source: LSEG, primary listings only. Chart: Financial Times

In an environment where very few companies are prepared to contemplate a listing in London, but where depressed valuations mean that corporate acquirers can buy high-quality, high-return businesses at massive discounts, even after paying huge premiums for control, we should not be surprised that the UK equity market is the stock market equivalent of the world’s corporate closing-down sale.

In the past ten years alone, more than 300 UK public companies with a combined value of over £500bn at today’s prices have been acquired by overseas buyers, according to the FT. So far in 2026, announced foreign acquisitions of whole UK-listed companies, including debt, have reached £73bn, the highest since 2018.

£73bnAnnounced foreign takeovers of whole UK-listed companies in 2026, including debt, the most since 2018 (FT)
LISTED COMPANIES BOUGHT BY AN OVERSEAS FIRM · % OF 2016 LISTINGS2016–2026

The UK is losing more of its listed companies to foreign takeovers than other major markets

15.3%
United Kingdom15.3%Netherlands14.6%Australia10.9%United States10.1%Canada8.9%Switzerland6.2%Germany6.0%Singapore5.4%France4.3%Japan1.4%% OF 2016 LISTED COMPANIES
FT analysis of LSEG, World Bank and WFE data; 100% takeovers only.

Self-inflicted harm

I said earlier in this piece that the FT had misdiagnosed the causes of this long decline by excluding the damage inflicted by the pension reforms of the early 2000s and the MiFID reforms of 2007 and 2018, which were implemented in the UK by the FCA.

It was clear at the time that these reforms would harm the infrastructure of the market, and many leading voices in the industry warned the government and the regulator to change tack. Unfortunately, these warnings fell on deaf ears, and the changes were pushed through despite “fierce opposition” from the industry.

So, for those wondering what’s caused this decline in the fabric of the UK equity market, one need look no further than the pension accounting and regulatory changes, many of which were invented here in the UK and which we then inflicted on ourselves. In other words, this was not done to the UK equity market by external events over which the UK had no control; it was and still is self-inflicted harm.

I should add finally that since these rules were enforced in the UK by the FCA back in 2018 there has been a rethink. Following that rethink the regulator has changed its stance and, from August 2024, it now does allow asset managers and investment firms to bundle payments for third-party research and trade execution together, in effect reinstating the rule that had applied before MiFID II came into effect.

The problem of course is that this has come too late, and in the intervening six years much damage was done to the infrastructure of the market, which can be seen graphically in the charts above.

Does any of this matter?

I suppose the key question here is: does any of this matter, other than to the stockbrokers, bankers and fund managers that work in the UK equity market? And as a follow-up, are there wider economic implications for the UK economy of a shrinking, dysfunctional equity market?

I suspect that the lack of attention paid to this worrying decline by successive governments might indicate that they think there aren’t. My view, not surprisingly, is very different. I think it does matter who owns UK corporate assets, and it does matter that the UK equity market has dried up as a source of funding for businesses, especially small ones that are listed and, in some ways, now trapped on it.

It also matters that, as the natural process of maturity and corporate evolution leads to more established companies being acquired by bigger international consolidators, new ones developing new technologies, services and products are able and keen to list to replace them.

Consequently, I think it is objectively true that a thriving public equity market, in which companies can raise capital to accelerate their growth and where fractional ownership can be readily traded, is beneficial to a host economy. Not only is access to growth capital vital for young businesses, enabling them to scale and provide more jobs and tax revenue for the government, but through fractional ownership of those businesses wealth can be created for all investors, either directly or through the retirement funds of all workers.

Bit by bit these important functions have been damaged by the long, slow decline of the foundations of the UK equity market and, although it still functions well, it is in some respects a shadow of its former self.

What can be done

The final question that naturally follows is what can be done, if anything, to repair the damage that has been inflicted on what is a vital piece of the UK’s economic infrastructure? Fortunately, I think there are reforms that can help the market to once again become the thriving ecosystem it once was.

The key missing ingredient is the near total absence from the market of scaled, long-term pension funds that used to be its biggest owners. As can be seen from the chart below, their exposure to the UK equity market is virtually non-existent and, shamefully, a fraction of their exposure to international equities, which has actually increased in recent years.

UK PRIVATE-SECTOR DB PENSION SCHEMES · % OF ASSETS2008–2025

UK shares have all but gone from defined benefit pension funds

0.7%
UK equitiesOverseas equitiesBonds
0%20%40%60%80%0.7%7.6%70.6%20082012201620202025
PPF Purple Book 2017 and 2025, weighted averages.

The average allocation in the UK is now down to just over 4%, with private sector DB schemes down at 1.4%, DC schemes at about 7% and local authority schemes averaging about 13%.

4.4%UK pension funds’ allocation to UK equities in 2024, against more than half of assets 25 years earlier (New Financial)

For an industry that for decades has been happily accepting huge UK taxpayer-funded reliefs, this is embarrassing, arguably a betrayal, and made worse by the fact that no other developed economy has presided over this level of disinvestment from its home equity market.

A New Financial report from September 2024 concluded that UK pension funds now have a significantly lower absolute and relative allocation to domestic equities than nearly all of their counterparts in developed economy pension systems around the world. It went on to state that UK pension funds could increase their allocation to the UK market by 50% to 100% and still be comfortably in line with international peers and historic norms.

Other reports highlight that the UK pension fund allocation to domestic equities is about half that of a European average, and compares with comparator funds in the US that typically allocate between 16% in LDI funds and 75% in DC funds, over 40% in New Zealand and Australia and just over 20% in Canada. In other words, the UK is at an extreme.

The solution is one that tends to elicit all sorts of alarm and despondency, because I am sufficiently persuaded that mandation is necessary. What I would advocate as a bare minimum for any fund that has benefited from UK taxpayer-funded reliefs is an allocation to UK equities that at least matches their international equity exposure, and I would give these funds a period of years to bring this rebalancing about.

With this in place the UK equity market could once again build the infrastructure it needs to cope with this level of reinvestment, and companies and their advisers could then start to plan for an environment in which raising capital in the market became a possibility rather than an unattainable dream, as it is today.

In time young businesses would also look at a UK listing as a genuinely viable and attractive option, and in time these funds might once again start to see the UK equity market as an attractive destination for their funds, as they used to do. In a relatively short period of time, the UK equity market could once again start to function appropriately by serving the needs of the domestic economy rather better than it does today.

This surely has to be a prize worth the effort. Properly diagnosed, the problems currently confronting the UK equity market could be solved, but the solutions do require a level of commitment to the end result that has not been visible in recent Chancellors.

Rachel Reeves did look at this issue but stepped back from the requirement to mandate, and as a result the solution remains out of reach. I see no inclination in the current incumbent to grapple with this either.

Having said all this, though, there is one silver lining, and that is that the UK equity market remains in the bargain basement and as such offers a risk-reward trade-off that is both absolutely and relatively very appealing and arguably unrivalled in any other developed economy market.

Nothing here is a recommendation. The data and the policy read are offered as analysis of the macro environment, not as a basis for investment decisions.

Important information

The views expressed in this article are those of the author at the date of publication and not necessarily those of Curated Capital Ltd. The contents of this article are not intended as investment advice and will not be updated after publication unless otherwise stated.