Macro

Wrong again: NIESR’s case for 5% interest rates

NIESR got this year’s growth badly wrong and now wants Bank Rate at around 5% to head off second-round effects that have not shown up. Wages, food prices and the oil market all suggest it is wrong again.

First published in Noise Cancelling

Deja Vu

I hope I will be forgiven for returning to a subject that I first wrote about last year but which, in a slightly different form, has reared its ugly head again. I am referring here to a pillar of the economic establishment, the National Institute of Economic and Social Research, which, undaunted by its embarrassing and ludicrous forecasts of last year, is at it again in its Autumn 2026 Economic Outlook.

In this document, NIESR outlines what it expects to happen in the years ahead, and as ever, it’s a grim read. In summary, it forecasts higher inflation persisting beyond 2027 and does not see it returning to the 2% target until 2030, principally because it expects second-round effects from the labour market, with workers demanding higher wage increases, and from firms raising prices.

As for growth, you guessed it, after getting this year’s outcome totally wrong, it is forecasting 1.1% in 2027, 0.9% in 2028 and 1.2% in 2029. Because these are even lower than the OBR’s expectations, it concludes that the government’s deficit reduction targets “lack credibility”.

Finally, this joyous read also suggests that the Bank of England should raise rates to “around 5%” to tackle the mounting price pressures and to bring inflation back to target quicker than its central forecast of the back end of 2030, which it acknowledges would take an additional 0.4% off GDP growth in 2028 and 2029.

As I said, a joyous read. But then so was NIESR’s August 2025 forecast of a £50bn black hole in the current budget deficit by 2029/30, which it suggested had to be filled by immediate tax increases. When the black hole failed to materialise in the November budget that year, even after the OBR’s productivity growth downgrades, NIESR published a document in December that attempted to explain where the black hole had gone.

As ever, black holes emerge or disappear based on what is embedded in the forecast. Not surprisingly, when you view the world through a bleak, half-empty lens, as NIESR does, all sorts of ugly things appear on the horizon, but they can all disappear again when viewed through a different one.

In the end, it didn’t take much for NIESR’s apocalyptic pre-budget view to evaporate, which happened when the OBR’s forecasts turned out to be only a little less bad than it had anticipated.

2026 forecast

Undaunted by this embarrassing episode, NIESR dug in again with yet another daft forecast, this time for growth in 2026. Back in the Spring, NIESR was forecasting growth of 0.9%. After strong growth in Q1, it upgraded that to 1.1% and has waited until November to upgrade again to 1.6%. I recall back in the spring, after the first upgrade, it confidently stated that the second half (of 2026) would be “markedly weaker”, as “higher energy costs squeeze real incomes and uncertainty weighs on investment (spending)”, which it forecast would fall in the second half of the year.

Well, it got all of that spectacularly wrong, again, as did so many other forecasters. Consumption spending held up well this year despite the challenge of higher energy prices, and investment spending grew strongly – both of which I anticipated right back at the start of the year.

In fact, growth in Q3 this year of 0.7%, far from being markedly weaker, was the strongest, outside of the pandemic, since 2017. And NIESR’s November upgrade to 1.6% is still too low. Indeed, the outcome for the full year may well be close to twice NIESR’s original forecast of 0.9%.

But again, without a hint of embarrassment or any explanation for its repeated forecast errors, it now confidently calls for interest rates to rise to 5% to head off persistently high inflation, which it states, without this monetary tightening, will remain above target until the second half of 2030.

The second-round effects that never arrived

As I’ve already said in this note, this ridiculous forecast is based on something which NIESR, most other forecasters and the Bank of England have been confidently expecting to happen all year, not because there is any evidence of it, but because it’s what their models tell them to anticipate following an energy price shock.

In other words, the ghostly second-round effects in the form of workers demanding higher wage increases and businesses raising prices. And instead of having a re-think based on the fact that these effects have not emerged despite the confident predictions that they would, the forecasters just assume they got the timing wrong and plough on regardless.

I get the theory, but as I’ve been saying all year, this isn’t what’s happening in the real world. There are forces already at work in the labour market that are keeping a lid on wage growth, and that’s reflected in data showing private sector wage settlements which are down at 3%, having fallen all year. Indeed, private sector wage growth has been falling consistently since the middle of 2023 (see chart below) and especially so since the Labour government came to power and significantly increased the cost of employing people in its first budget. With the AI industrial revolution beginning to ripple through the UK’s service-focused economy, I expect these pressures on wage growth to continue, not to evaporate as NIESR expects.

GB AVERAGE WEEKLY EARNINGS · ANNUAL GROWTH3-MONTH AVERAGE · JAN–MAR 2001 – JUN–AUG 2026

Pay growth has been slowing since mid-2023

3.7%
Total pay (nominal)Regular pay (nominal)Total pay (real)Regular pay (real)
−10%−5%0%5%10%3.7%0.7%Aug 02Aug 08Aug 14Aug 20Aug 26
ONS, seasonally adjusted.

Food prices tell the same story

The absence of ghostly second round effects is not just confined to the labour market. They have also stubbornly refused to appear in food price inflation which economic consensus expected to be the first to succumb to elevated energy prices. In fact, food price inflation has fallen all year and now stands (in September) at 1.3% having been at 4.5% in December last year. This reflects an intensely competitive food retail market which will persist through the key Christmas trading period. This would be obvious to anyone that had actually spoken to the food retailers rather than indulging in the economic equivalent of navel examination.

Having said that I do expect food price inflation to pick up a bit from this incredibly low level, but what’s happened to this key component of the inflation basket all year demonstrates the gulf between what models spew out and what happens in the real world.

Clearly some businesses will be able to increase prices which may stick, but equally there will be many who won’t. These businesses will look to drive greater productivity into what they do to protect them from higher energy related costs and that may well involve deploying more AI technology to replace expensive labour or just replacing higher cost labour with capital. Or, in other words, the reflex that NIESR still anticipates in the form of companies raising prices, like most of their other forecasts, will turn out to be completely wrong.

What’s happening in the Gulf

It also looks to me as if many forecasters, including NIESR, are not paying enough attention to what’s happening in the Persian Gulf. The “war” continues, and an agreed settlement may prove impossible to deliver, but as OPEC reports released this week show, record oil exports are emerging from the region despite the conflict.

Indeed, Bloomberg and the IEA went as far as to suggest that an oil “surplus” will emerge this quarter and that the “surplus” will widen significantly next year. My guess, reading this, is that even if a settlement remains out of reach, oil prices will not be as elevated as the likes of NIESR have assumed. Indeed, the $20-a-barrel fall over the last two weeks might suggest that it’s time to have a rethink here.

Wrong again

I didn’t want this note to get bogged down in lots of data points, but I did want to highlight why I believe NIESR’s Eeyore forecasts for the UK economy are once again going to be very wrong.

This organisation, along with most other forecasters, the OBR and especially the Bank of England, seem to have been captured by models which keep spewing out hopelessly bad forecasts that all err on the same side – way too bearish whether it’s on growth or inflation.

NIESR has managed to come up with an especially daft forecast this time, but it is not alone. Too many members of the MPC seem to have swallowed the same theoretical nonsense and are fully signed up to the idea that higher rates are essential and will soon head off the second-round effects they have been forecasting would emerge all year but have refused to do so.

But instead of thinking why they might be wrong, they just plough on in a fog of arrogant self-confidence.

I am confident they will be wrong again and presumptuously might suggest they learn from their recent errors rather than just ignoring them. As someone once said, “you don’t evolve from being right – you evolve from owning when you’re wrong”.

Nothing here is a recommendation. The data and the policy read are offered as analysis of the macro environment, not as a basis for investment decisions.

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The views expressed in this article are those of the author at the date of publication and not necessarily those of Curated Capital Ltd. The contents of this article are not intended as investment advice and will not be updated after publication unless otherwise stated.